A note on environmental risk and the rate of discount by S. P. A. Brown
•
No. 8202
A NOTE ON ENVIRONMENTAL RISK
AND THE RATE OF DISCOUNT
by
s. P. A. Brm'rn
June 1982
Research Paper
Federal Reserve Bankof Dallas
This publication was digitized and made available by the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas' Historical Library (FedHistory@dal.frb.org)No.8~2
A NOTE ON ENVIRONMENTAL RISK
AND THE RATE OF OISCOUNT
by
S. P. A. Brown
June 1982
This ;s a working paper and should not be quoted or reproduced in whole or
in part without the written consent of the author. The views expressed are
those of the author and should not be attributed to the Federal Reserve
Bank of Dallas or any other part of the Federal Reserve System.ABSTRACT
A NOTE ON ENVIRONMENTAL RISK AND THE RATE OF DISCOUNT
This paper examines the use of risk-adjusted discount rates to
evaluate future environmental risks. It is determined that the
risk-adjusted discount rate should be lower--not higher--than the risk-free
rate if evaluation of future environmental risks ;s to point toward
optimality.ANOTE ON ENVIRONMENTAL RISK ANa THE RATE OF OISCOUNTl
INTROOUCTI ON
In their celebrated paper "Uncertai nty and the Evaluation of
Public Investment Dectstons," Kenneth Arrow and Robert Lind[l] showed that
uncertainty tn public investments could be pooled across tno i vidua l s, thus
reducing the risk for a single individual to zero. One result was that no
risk premium would be utilized in discounting the time stream of benefits
and costs. In a later paper, Anthony Fisher[3] narrowed the apparent
appl icabil ity of the Arrow-L; nd Theorem by dernonstr-attn9 that pure publ ic
risk, as evidenced in the pure public bad of fluorocarbon depletion of the
ozone layer, could not be pooled across individuals because one
individual's assumption of risk does not reduce the risk shouldered by
others. It irrunediately follows from Fisher's analysis that risk premiums
should be assigned in the evaluation of particular environmental risks.
The present work is an extension of the Fisher paper, and examines the
unresolved issue as to what sign should be attached to environmental risk
premiums. A surprising conclusion is obtained: environmental risk
premiums are negative, and the risk-adjusted discount rate used to evaluate
environmental risks is lower than the risk-free rate, if analysis is to
point toward optimality.
Our surprising result has important policy implications. If we
increase discount rates to adjust for ri sk (as is the convention) in
evaluating future environmental costs, those costs are assigned a lesser
weight in a present value cost benefit analysis. If, however, we- 2 -
risk-adjust discount rates downward, future environmental costs attain
greater importance in a present value cost benefit analysis.
NEUMANN-MORGENSTERN UTILITY. RISK AVERSION ANO NEGATIVE RISKS
The economics literature has a long tradition in the theoretical
analysis of risk.2 It has been clearly established that risk-averse
individuals are willing to: 1) accept a sure payment that ;s less than the
mean of a distribution of expected payments, and 2) make a sure paynent
that is greater than the actuarially fair amount to avoid a distribution of
expected payouts. Although the analysis underlying the second proposition
is familiar, it is essential to our argument and we recapitulate it here
using Neumann-Morgenstern utility.3
Cons; der an ;nd; vidua1 wi th an income endowment of V faci ng an
uncertain loss of income from a bad4 whose value has a known distribution,
B. The resulting expected income is:
where:
E(Y') = Y - E(B) (1)
E{V
I
) is the expected value of income, V" after the loss. B;
Y is the endowment income;
E(B) is the expected value of the loss, B.
For a risk-neutral individual the expected utility of V".
E(U(Y')) equals the utility of the expected income, U(E(Y')). For a risk-
loving individual E(U(Y')) > U(E(Y')). For a risk-averse individual
E(U(Y')) < U(E(Y')). We continue analysis on the premise that society is
comprised of risk-averse individuals.5- 3 -
Given that U(E(Y')) > E(U(Y')) for a risk-averse individual there
exists some sure income, y* < E(Y') such that U(Y*) = E(U(Y')). Algebraic
manipulation allows to determine that our risk-averse individual is willing
to pay up to y-y* to avoid the expected loss, E(B).
reveals that:
Y - y* > Y - E(Y') = E(B)
Algebra further
(2 )
Equation (2) ;s merely an affirmation that a typical household is
willing to purchase insurance at a price in excess of actuarial value to
avoid facing uncertain losses. If we were examining a regulation or
investment to reduce environmental damage, reduction of r-t sk to the
representative household is a benefit and should be taken into account.
Simi larly if we are examining projects accompanied by uncertain--and
expectedly detrimental--environmental consequences, increased risk is a
cost to the representative household and optimality requires that it be
taken into account.
FUTURE ENVIRONMENTAL RISK AND DISCOUNTING
Using the variables of the previous section, EdBd is the
expected cost of future environmental ri sk and Yt - Yt* is the certai n
income loss with equivalent util ity. Both are val ued in each period, t ,
The discounted present value of future costs is appropriately evaluated as:
T
DPV = E (I + r)-t. (Yt - Yt*);
t=l
where: r is the marginal rate of time preference;6
T is the time horizon over which the risk is evaluated.
(3 )
Alternatively, we can choose some risk-adjusted rate of discount such that:- 4 -
(4J
where: it is the risk-adjusted discount rate for period t ,
Given Y t - Y t* > Et(Bt) for all t and a positive r value, algebra yields
it < r for each period t , deroonstrating that the discount rate should be
decreased to evaluate future environmental risks, if a risk-adjusted
dtscount rate approach ;s adopted. 7 The a1ternati ve to usi n9 a
risk-adjusted discount rate is found in equation (3) above.8
Other risks may warrant attention in a benefit-cost analysis.
Most prominent would be the risk inherent in the costs of government action
to reduce the environmental damage. If the government intervenes to reduce
B t to zero for all t, income for each period will be Yt - Ct, where Ct ;s a
random variable describing the cost of government intervention. Just as
the risk averse individual is willing to pay more than Et(Bt) to insure
against variance of the environmental risk, so will that individual be
willing to pay more than EdCt} to insure against variance in the costs of
i ntervention.
The same logic then applies to each of the two courses of action.
Et(BtJ and EdCt} should be discounted at rates below r to make their
discounted present values larger, reflecting the willingness to pay to
avoid their variances.9 The two risk-adjusted rates will not generally be
the same.- 5 -
SOCIAL EVALUATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL RISK
To this point, analysis has been on the basis of a single
individual facing an environmental risk. Aggregation across individuals
with potentially different degrees of risk aversion to find a social
risk-adjusted discount rate bears consideration. lO
Assuming environmental risk is a pure public bad for each time
period t, summation of equation (3) over n individuals yields
n
SOCIAL COST = E
j=1
n T
DPV· = E E(I + r}-t'dY',t
J j =I t= I J
(5 )
where: aYj,t==Yj,t - Yj,t* for individual j fn period t ,
Given dYj,t > Et(Bt) for all j and t, algebra is used to show that for each
period there is some social risk-adjusted discount rate It< r such that:ll
n
SOCIAL COST = E DPVj
j=1
T
= n E (I +Ttl-t EdBt).
t=1
(6)
Equation (6) is equivalent to:
n






E(I + ij,tl-t. Et(Btl;
t=1
(7)
where: ij.t is the risk adjusted discount rate for individual j in period
t. However, given all t ~ 1, n> 1, and ij,t > a for all j and t it can be
shown that:12
(8) for each t=l, ..., T.
n
it ~ lin E ij,t,
j=1
If any two of the ij,t's are unequal for a given t, the inequality in (8)
becomes strict. If we are willing to assume that risk increases
exponentially with time for each person, the time subscript can be dropped
from the risk-adjusted discount rates, i, in (6), (7) and (8).- 6 -
Given individuals with differing degrees of risk-aversion, (8)
reveals that the social risk-adjusted discount rate for evaluating a pure
public bad is less than the average of individual rates, reflecting the
higher weighting, given to individuals with greater risk-aversion, tn the
formation of i t •13 This suggests that if differing degrees of risk-
aversion toward an pure public environmental risk are exhibited. the
benefit-cost analyst ts advised not to use an arithmetic average
risk-adjusted discount rate to represent the social rate. Alternatives are
to determine the arithmetic average maximum willingness to pay for use in
(5), or to use a number of representative discount rates in (7).
SUMMARY
This note has shown that the risk-adjusted discount rate applied
to future environmental risks should be lower than the risk-free rate if
benefit-cost analysis is to point toward optimal tty, Further, for
environmental risks that are pure public bads, aggregation across
i ndi vidua1s preserves the re1ationship between the ri sk-adjusted di scount
rate and the risk-free rate. However, simple averaging of individual
risk-adjusted d;scount rates may not y; e1d the socia1 rt sk-adjusted
discount rate.REFERENCES
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IThe author is indebted to James C. Owings for helpful comments.
2For example see M. Friedman and L. J. Savage[4] or J. v. Neumann and O.
Morgenstern[5]•
3The use of Neumann-Morgenstern utility ;s purely for expository purposes.
4A bad is an object or disservice that confers negative benefits and has
positive disposal costs.
5This premise is not without foundation. See M. J. Bailey. M. 01 son and P.
Wonnacott[2].
6M. Olson and M. J. Bailey[6] have refined the definition of time preference
into pure time preference and marginal time preference. We use the
Olson-Bailey terminology.
7Lowering the discount rate from r to it is equivalent to adding a negative
risk premium to r to obtain ito In practice a single risk-adjusted
discount rate may be utilized for all periods. However, if the use of a
single risk-adjusted rate for all periods is to accurately represent the
present discounted val ue of the cost distribution for each period, it is
implied that risk, defined as (Yt - Yt*)/Et(Bt), increases exponentially
with time, t ,- 2 -
SIn utilizing (3) to obtain it < r , we implicitly assume that the maximum
"insurance premium" that the household is willing to pay to avoid the
environmental fisk ts the appropriate measure of cost. If premiums for
insurance policies covering purely private expected losses typically afford
the purchasing household a consumer surplus, why should we utilize maximum
willingness to pay in obtaining it < r? Because of the possibility of
pooling purely private risk across a sufficiently large population, private
risk insurance typically sells for actuarial value plus transactions
costs. However, as we stated in the opening paragraph Fisher demonstrated
that pure public risk cannot be pooled across individuals. Hence,
insurance against pure public risk would not be made available by the
private sector for a price equal to actuarial value plus transactions
costs. Indeed, even if a firm was able to collect premiums equal to the
maximum willingness to pay, the possibility of default would remain, given
normal--not extreme--risk aversion.
9If the risks can be pooled across individuals, a risk-adjusted discount
rate would not be appropriate for evaluating intervention costs.
lOWhether individuals acting in a perfect market can have differing degrees
of risk aversion when evaluating a pure public bad may be controversial.
The author has chosen not to enter into that argument here.
llFor an environmental risk that was not a pure public bad, pooling would
obtain l1Yj,t = Et(Bt) and we would obtain it = r , Clearly, our social
aggregation results are dependent upon Fisher's narrowing of Arrow-Lind.- 3 -
Thus. (l/nE(uj)-t)-I/t
values in (6) and (7) for
E (l+ij.t)-t Et(Bt)
(l/nE(1+ij.t)-t)-I/t.
12For convenience let Uj 55 (1 + lj,t). Because the arithmetic mean is
nonstrictly greater than the harmonic mean for Uj > 1, we may write
l/nE(uj) ~ (l/nE(uj)-I)-1 (Note that all summation here is over j). We
generalize the harmonic mean as: g = (l/nE(uj)-t)-I/t. The generalized
harmonic mean decreases nonstrictly as t increases (i.e., ogjot ~ 0).
< l/nE(uj) for t ~ 1. Obtaining identical
each period, t , requires that n(l+itl-t• Et(Bt) =
for each t , Manipulation yields: l+T t =
each period t , If any two of the ij,tlS are unequal for a given period, t ,
all of the inequalities for that period become strict.
13This does not mean that individuals with greater risk-aversion receive a
higher weighting in the benefit-cost analysis. The use of it in (6) is
equivalent to using the arithmetic mean, 4Yt 55 l/nE.&Yj,t, to replace each
~j.t in (5).